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The use and manufacture of tools have been considered to be cognitively
demanding and thus a possible driving factor in the evolution of intelligence.
In this study, we tested the hypothesis that enhanced physical cognitive abilities
evolved in conjunction with the use of tools, by comparing the performance of
naturally tool-using and non-tool-using species in a suite of physical and gen-
eral learning tasks. We predicted that the habitually tool-using species, New
Caledonian crows and Gala´pagos woodpecker finches, should outperform
their non-tool-using relatives, the small tree finches and the carrion crows in a
physical problem but not in general learning tasks. We only found a divergence
in the predicted direction for corvids. That only one of our comparisons sup-
ports the predictions under this hypothesis might be attributable to different
complexities of tool-use in the two tool-using species. A critical evaluation is
offered of the conceptual and methodological problems inherent in comparative
studies on tool-related cognitive abilities.1. Introduction
Animal tool-use has inspired researchers of comparative cognition for decades.
Much of this interest stems from the putative role of tool-use in the evolution of
human intelligence. The idea is that as tools gained importance in the ecology of
early hominids, selection acted upon cognitive abilities to improve their tool-
using proficiency [1]. In this scenario, information-processing was honed in the con-
text of tool manufacture and use, but gradually led to more complex and general
cognitive abilities. Alternately, human tool-use may have evolved as a by-product
of generalized intelligence evolved in another context (e.g. [2]). Thus, it is not sur-
prising that much comparative research on tool-use traditionally revolved around
anthropocentric questions, mainly that of whether and to what extent animal
tool-use indicates continuity in the mental abilities of animals and humans.
Today, reports of tool-use in animals abound, ranging from insects to birds
[3]. Animal tool-use varies tremendously in its complexity and neuronal under-
pinnings and thus, a fundamental revision of the original notion that tool-use is
per se a reflection of intelligence has become necessary. Nevertheless, there are
still reasons not to discard the idea of a potential link between intelligence and
tool-use entirely. One is the existence of animal tool-use bearing the hallmarks
of ‘sophisticated’ and potentially complex information-processing abilities,
e.g. those instances involving use of multiple tools, sequential tool-use and/
or complex tool modification in the wild. The rarity of sophisticated forms of
animal tool-use furthermore suggests that there are constraints for its evolution,
possibly cognitive abilities and/or neural substrate. Another reason is the
existence of supporting correlational evidence: for birds, there is a strong
relationship between tool-use and brain size [4] and tool-use and brain structure
[5], and tool-use and brain size are related in primates [6]. It is therefore impor-
tant to investigate the relationship between tool-use and enhanced cognition,
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2but with a focus on identifying the kinds of cognitive tool-
related adaptations to expect, and with clear predictions
of where to look for them. Two approaches could be particu-
larly useful in guiding us to answers. The first is cost–benefit
analysis: tool-related cognitive adaptations are expected only
where tool-use is under strong selection. Furthermore, it may
help to generate hypotheses that can explain why a particular
species evolved tool-use, whereas a closely related species
did not. Second, once hypotheses about the relationship of
tool-use and cognitive traits have been formulated, compar-
ing cognitive performance between closely and distantly
related species is essential to test them. In elaborating
upon the significance of each of these approaches, we will
be focusing on the context in which most tool-use occurs,
namely foraging.ocB
368:20120418(a) The cost and benefits of tool-use and their
link to evolution
The main benefit of tool-use in foraging may be an increase in
quantity or quality of prey that is inaccessible without tools [7].
Unfortunately, quantitative data on the nutritional benefit of
tool-use are scarce [7–12]. At least for some species, it has
been shown that tool-use is more costly than conventional
foraging techniques in terms of time [8,9]. The costs of learning
and the expenditure of cognitive resources involved in tool-use
and its development are more difficult to pin down. Learning
to use tools during ontogeny has been shown to be a substan-
tial investment at least for chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes,
[13,14]) and New Caledonian crows (NCCs; Corvus mondelu-
doides: [15–17]). Other factors and constraints that could
influence the evolution of tool-use are for instance the avail-
ability of tool-materials, morphology, behavioural and
cognitive traits such as sociality and motivation to play and
interact with objects, neural substrate and related energetic
costs [18,19]. Such limiting factors could operate to constrain
or enable the evolution of tool-use at various stages, such as
during its invention, its diffusion through the population
and its maintenance in a population.
The interplay between costs, benefits and limiting factors
can be exemplified by a comparison of the tool-using wood-
pecker finches (WPFs Cactospiza pallida) and the small tree
finch (STF; Camarhynchus parvulus), a sympatric non-tool-using
species that is closely related to the WPF. Though they are both
extractive foragers, the WPF is more specialized on extracting
concealed prey from a substrate. Its straight beak is not only
ideal for pecking at the substrate, but also well-suited for
manipulating tools and may allow better vision at the beak
tip [20]. Similarly, other characteristics related to extractive
foraging such as perseverance and high levels of neophilia
might have increased the likelihood for the evolution of tool-
use in this species. To summarize, slight differences in ecology
and morphology can significantly influence the cost–benefit
ratio and the effect of constraining factors, thus indirectly
influencing the evolutionary trajectory of tool-use.(b) The comparative approach
Traditionally, there has been a strong focus of tool-use studies
on comparing tool-related complex cognition (e.g. causal
understanding) between humans and various primates
(reviewed in [21–24]) though a small number of studieshave also investigated the tool- related cognitive abilities of
non-tool-using primates [25–27].
A deviation from the focus on primates occurred with the
discovery of highly sophisticated tool-use in NCCs, involving
use of multiple tools to extract arthropods from various sub-
strates and complex tool manufacture in the wild (reviewed
in [28,29]). In the laboratory, they appropriately select and
modify tools for a given task [30,31], display elements of plan-
ning in meta-tool tasks [32,33] and are able to develop
spontaneous solutions to novel technical problems using
novel materials in novel ways [34,35]. Until recently, the tool-
related cognition of NCCs was considered unique among
corvids. However in 2009, rooks (Corvus frugilegus), a non-
tool-using corvid species, were found to perform similarly to
NCCs in several cognitive tool-related tasks [36]. This suggests
that the special cognitive abilities of NCCs may have evolved
in another context preceding the evolution of tool-use [2].
The findings of Emery & Bird [36] remind us of the
importance of a rigorous comparative programme to deter-
mine whether there is a general pattern of association
between an adaptive cognitive specialization and tool-use.
This should not only entail comparisons between distantly
related tool-users, but also between closely related tool-
users and non-tool-users. Thereby, repeated appearance of
the cognitive trait in question only in tool-users in phylogen-
etically independent species pairs would be strong evidence
for a cognitive adaptation [37].2. Our study: test of tool-related physical
cognition in corvids
Over the past 5 years, we have applied the comparative
method, as described earlier, to two species pairs to investi-
gate the question of whether the use of tools evolved in
conjunction with enhanced and specialized physical cogni-
tive abilities. Previously, we compared general learning and
physical cognitive abilities in the WPF and a closely related
non-tool-using species, the STF. WPFs habitually use twigs
or cactus spines to extract arthropods from crevices and
show simple modification of these tools such tool shortening
or breaking of side twigs [8].
We predicted that if tool-use evolved with enhanced
specialized cognitive abilities, WPFs should outperform STFs
in physical tasks but not necessarily in the general learning
tasks. Contrary to expectation, the STFs performed similarly
or better than WPFs in one of the general learning tasks and
most of the physical tasks [38,39]. Thus, the study yielded
no evidence that WPFs have enhanced physical cognition.
The aim of this study was to provide highly comparable
data from a new tool-using/non-tool-using species pair from
a distantly related group using the methods which had been
applied in the preceding Darwin’s finch study. This allows a
more complete assessment of the hypothesis that tool-use
might generally be associated with adaptive cognitive specializ-
ations in the physical domain. Using the paradigms previously
established with Darwin’s finches, we tested physical cognition
and general learning abilities in tool-using NCCs and a non-
tool-using species, the carrion crow (Corvus corone). To our
knowledge, ours is the only study to rigorously apply the
comparative method to interspecific comparisons of closely
related tool-using/non-tool-using species pairs in two distantly
(a)
(b) (c) (d) (e)
10 cm
Figure 1. (a) The cane task apparatus with canes and rewards arranged as in the
initial test condition. Panels (b)–(e) transfer tasks 1–4. Adapted from [38,39].
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3related groups and using identical learning paradigms to test
all the species involved.
(a) Methods
(i) Study locations, subjects and housing
All NCCs and one hooded crow (Corvus cornix) were tested at
the Avian Cognition Research Station (ACRS) hosted by the
Max Planck Institute for Ornithology (MPIO), Seewiesen,
Germany from March to November 2011. All carrion and
the remaining hooded crows were tested at the Konrad
Lorenz Research Station (KLF) in Gru¨nau, Austria from
June to August 2011 and at the MPIO in June 2009 and
November 2009–May 2010. The test for neophilia (see
below) was conducted in 2012 at the ACRS and KLF, and
the NCCs were not the same as the ones tested in the other
tasks (see the electronic supplementary material, table S1).
The data from two hooded crows were included in the car-
rion crow dataset as these closely related species have been
only recently split into two separate species and share similar
ecology and morphology [40]. Although the hooded crows
are treated as carrion crows for the statistical analysis, these
individuals have been made distinguishable from the carrion
crows in the graphs. Furthermore, some WPFs do not use
tools (detailed explanation in the methods of the electronic
supplementary material, see also [38]). The WPF dataset is
therefore comprised tool-using and non-tool-using individuals,
and this distinction is taken into account in the analysis. A sum-
mary clarifying the order of experiments, the participation of
each bird in each experiment as well as rearing history is
given in the methods section and the electronic supplementary
material, table S1. Further details concerning rearing experience
and housing are also in the methods section of the electronic
supplementary material.
(ii) Experiment 1: the cane task
This experiment involved food retrieval contingent on making
a choice between two canes, only one of which could retrieve
the reward. In each condition, one food reward was inside the
hooked portion of the cane and one outside of it (with the
exception of transfer task 4 in which both rewards were
inside the hooked portion of both canes; figure 1). Eight
NCCs, five carrion crows, two hooded crows and 12 WPFs
participated in this experiment.
Transfer tasks. Those subjects that solved the initial version
of the task by reaching the set learning criterion (see below)
within a maximum of 180 trials were then tested in four further
variations of the initial task (transfer tasks, figure 1b–e), where
they received a maximum of 20 trials in each.
(iii) Experiment 2: the reversal task
The apparatus consisted of two feeders covered with coloured
lids (orange and blue) that were mounted 30 cm apart on a
grey Perspex base (50 50 cm). In each trial, a reward was
placed in one of the feeders, the lids were placed on the feeders
and birds were then allowed to remove one of the two lids.
A transparent Perspex divider prevented the birds from
removing the lid of both feeders. The experiment consisted
of two phases: an initial ‘acquisition phase’ and a ‘reversal
phase’. In the acquisition phase, only one colour was the
rewarded (Sþ) stimulus. Half of the birds started with
orange as Sþ and the other half with blue as Sþ. Once asubject met criterion (see general experimental procedure),
the colour-reward contingency was reversed in the reversal
phase. Subjects were given a maximum of 140 trials in each
phase. Eight NCCs, seven carrion crows, one hooded crow
and 16 WPFs were tested in this experiment.
(iv) Experiment 3: the novel box-opening task
The apparatus was a box made of opaque, white Perspex with
a transparent lid (box: width¼ 15 depth ¼ 12  height¼
12 cm; lid overlaps edge at front by 3 cm). The lid was
hinged to the back edge of the box and overlapped the front
edge of the box. The box could be opened by pushing the pro-
truding lip of the lid upwards. Before testing, birds were
habituated to the box by feeding from it once while it was
open. Subjects were given six sessions of 25 min, receiving
up to three sessions per day. A bird was successful and testing
was ended when it opened the box and ate the reward. If a
bird did not make physical contact with the box during a ses-
sion, it was re-habituated to the box as described above and
the session was repeated. A bird was given up to two extra ses-
sions upon failing to make contact with the box in any one
session. Eight NCCs, seven carrion crows and two hooded
crows were tested in this study. Additionally, we compare
the NCC data to that of 18 WPFs which were tested for a pre-
vious study [38]. The ‘total length of testing’ (s) and ‘success’
(opening box and gaining access to the food reward) were
the measurements taken for comparison.
(v) General experimental procedure
Experiments were conducted in the home aviaries of the
birds, and food was removed from their aviaries approxi-
mately 2 h before testing. The apparatus was baited out of
sight of the subject, and for each trial, placed onto the
experimental table or experimental area within the home
aviary. The experimenter then left and observed the trial
via camcorder.
Experiments 1–2 were two-choice learning experiments
involving the same basic procedure. These tasks were con-
ducted in blocks of 10 trials. In each trial, the subject was
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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4given 5 min to choose between two options for which the
correct side was pseudorandomized and counterbalanced
right and left. Some slight modifications to the original testing
conditions and testing regime with WPFs were made with the
corvids (see the electronic supplementary material, methods).
Learning criterion. To meet the success criterion, a bird had
to make 15 or more correct choices within two consecutive
blocks of 10 trials. Specifically, the number of correct responses
in one of the two blocks had to be at least seven consecutively
correct and in the other at least eight or in one block all
10 correct. This criterion was derived using a Monte Carlo
simulation (details in [41]). Some subjects developed a pos-
itional bias, which we defined as six consecutive choices of
one side, probably owing to intermittent reinforcement.
When this happened, we applied a side bias correction pro-
cedure (‘correction trials’, see the electronic supplementary
material, methods for details).
(vi) Statistical analysis
Fisher’s exact test was used to test for species differences in
the proportion of individuals to meet the success criterion.
We also compared learning speed and success probabi-
lity between NCCs and carrion crows/hooded crows and
between NCCs and WPFs in the initial phases of the cane
task and for both phases of the reversal task using general-
ized linear mixed models, specifying logistic regression
with binomial errors (GLMM, [42]). For each species compari-
son, a separate model was constructed for the initial phase of
the cane task and for both phases of the reversal task. Prior to
fitting the model, we z-transformed trial number to a mean of
0 and a standard deviation of 1, and side bias correction trials
were removed from all datasets. Full details of the modelling
process and the full model results can be found in the
methods and results sections, electronic supplementary
material, tables S2–S4.
Each statistical comparison between NCCs and WPFs
was conducted once only with tool-using WPFs and once
with all WPFs pooled (details in the electronic supplementary
material, methods). Since the conclusions always remained the
same regardless of which WPF grouping was used, we report
only results for the comparison of NCCs with pooled WPFs.
All statistics were conducted with R v. 2.15.1 [43].
(vii) Comparison of novelty reactions and motivation between
corvid species
Novelty reactions between carrion crows and NCCs were
assessed in two different ways.
First, we presented individuals with a novel object
(green dog-toy ball, electronic supplementary material, figure
S1) and measured latency to first contact. Birds received one
10 min session per day during which they were separated
from other birds. If they did not approach the object within a
session, the novel object was removed and the individual
received another session the next day. The test ended after the
session in which the birds first touched the object or after 13 ses-
sions, if individuals did not approach before. Each bird received
a value calculated by adding the total session time until it
touched the object for the first time. Birds that did not touch
the ball within 13 sessions received a ceiling value which was
calculated by adding one to the highest latency to touch the
ball among the other crows. The Mann–Whitney U-test was
used to compare ball touch latencies between the species.Second, we measured the latency to approach the cane
apparatus and also to touch the cane averaged over the first
50 trials for each individual (details in the electronic sup-
plementary material). While strictly speaking, these do not
provide measures of novelty reaction, they do however pro-
vide a way of comparing the motivation with which these
animals interacted with the cane apparatus. We deemed this
important as carrion crows are known to be neophobic,
when approaching novel food [44] and differences in motiv-
ation could potentially explain differences in cane task
performance. These measures were scored from videos by
M.F.S. In trials where the birds did not approach the apparatus
at all in 5 min, birds were given a ceiling value, which was
derived by adding 1 to the maximum time in each category.
The Mann–Whitney U-test was used to compare apparatus
approach and cane touch latencies between the species.
(b) Results
(i) Experiment 1: the cane task
Neither the five carrion crows nor the two hooded crows
were able to solve the initial task, while five of the eight
NCCs and eight of the 12 WPFs met the learning criterion
in this phase. The proportion of NCCs and WPFs to reach cri-
terion in the initial task did not differ significantly (Fisher’s
exact test: p ¼ 1). However, proportionally more NCCs than
carrion crows solved the initial task (Fisher’s exact test, p ¼
0.026). The disparity in learning performance in the initial
task between NCCs and carrion crows was further reflected
in the significant difference in the speed with which they
improved in this task (corvid model: species  trial: x21 ¼
4.13, p ¼ 0.042; figure 2).
NCCs and WPFs did not differ significantly in their
learning speed of the initial task (tool-user model: species 
trial: x21 ¼ 0.001, p ¼ 0.973; figure 2) nor did they differ in
their overall success probability (tool-user model: species:
x21¼ 2.21, p¼ 0.137; figure 2). Nevertheless, they generally
learned over the course of trials (tool-user model: trial: z¼ 4.98,
p, 0.001; figure 2).
Transfer performance. The five NCCs and eight WPFs that
successfully solved the initial task were subsequently tested
in four transfer tasks. Only one WPF and no NCCs met
criterion in the first transfer task. Two NCCs and one tool-
using WPF met criterion in the second transfer task. As we
found previously, performance was best in the third transfer
task where three NCCs and six WPFs met criterion. No
individuals solved the fourth transfer task.
To further assess transfer differences between NCCs and
WPFs, we pooled data from the first two transfer tasks for
each bird and calculated the proportion of trials in which
birds made a correct choice to the total trials received in the
first two sessions. We used only data from the first two ses-
sions of each transfer, because the sample size of NCCs
declined to four after the second transfer task since one
subject fell ill. There was no significant difference in transfer
performance between NCCs (median proportional correct ¼
1.58, range ¼ 1.21–1.74) and WPFs (median ¼ 1.79, range ¼
1.53–2.22) according to this measure (Mann–Whitney
U-test: NNCC ¼ 5, NWPF ¼ 8; U ¼ 9; p ¼ 0.124).
(ii) Experiment 2: the reversal task
All individuals met the learning criterion during the acqui-
sition phase and also in the reversal phase, with the
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Figure 2. Logistic regression models of success probability across trial number for two-choice learning tasks. (a) Acquisition phase and (b) reversal phase in the
reversal task, (c) the cane task. Each row refers to one of the three test groups (CC, carrion crows; NCC, New Caledonian crows; WPF, woodpecker finches. Points refer
to the proportion of correct trials per block of 10 trials for each individual. Data and models from the hooded crows, a subgroup of the carrion crows, are denoted by
dashed lines and solid black points. Graphs from WPFs were adapted from [38].
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5exception of one carrion crow, two NCCs and one WPF in the
reversal phase. NCCs and carrion crows did not differ in their
speed of learning either in the acquisition phase (acquisition
phase model: group  trial number: x21 ¼ 0.02, p ¼ 0.882;
figure 2) or in the reversal phase (reversal phase model:
species  trial number: x21 ¼ 0.14, p ¼ 0.711; figure 2)
although individuals clearly improved in both phases of the
task (acquisition phase-corvid model: trial number: z ¼ 6.52,
p, 0.0001; reversal phase model: trial number: z ¼ 6.92,
p, 0.0001; figure 2). Overall success probability also did
not differ between these species in the acquisition phase
(species: x21 ¼ 0.17, p ¼ 0.682; figure 2) and in the reversal
phase (species: x21 ¼ 0.76, p ¼ 0.383; figure 2).
In the acquisition phase, WPFs were significantly faster in
their learning speed than NCCs (acquisition phase model:
species  trial number: x21 ¼ 10.08, p ¼ 0.001; figure 2) but not
in the reversal phase (reversal phase model: species  trial
number: x21¼ 0.001, p ¼ 0.974; figure 2). There was no species
difference in overall success probability in the reversal phase
(reversal phase model: species: x21 ¼ 0.0005, p¼ 0.982; figure 2)
though individuals clearly improved over trials in this phase
(reversal phase model: z ¼ 8.53, p, 0.001; figure 2).(iii) Experiment 3: the novel box-opening task
Five NCCs, eight WPFs and six carrion crows successfully
solved the task within six sessions. There was no significant
difference in proportional success between carrion crowsand NCCs (Fischer’s exact test, p ¼ 1), nor was there a signifi-
cant difference in proportional success between NCCs and
WPFs (Fisher’s exact test, p ¼ 0.673).
Comparison latency to success. When the length (in seconds)
of all sessions was summed for each individual and species
comparisons conducted, we found no significant differences
either between NCCs (median ¼ 6269 s, range ¼ 82–9000)
and carrion crows (median ¼ 1740 s, range¼ 34–9000; Mann–
Whitney U-test: NCC ¼ 9, NNCC ¼ 8, U ¼ 30.5, p ¼ 0.623) or
between WPFs (median ¼ 9000 s, range ¼ 50–9000) and
NCCs (Mann–Whitney U-test: NWPF¼ 18, NNCC ¼ 8, U ¼ 55,
p ¼ 0.327).(iv) Comparison of novelty reactions and motivation between
corvid species
There was no evidence of a significant species difference either
in the median mean times to approach the cane apparatus (car-
rion crows: median approach time ¼ 6.16 s, range¼ 4.68–
48.48; NCCs: median¼ 6.75 s, range¼ 2.12 –21.98; Mann–
Whitney U-test: NCC ¼ 7, NNCC ¼ 8, U ¼ 18, p ¼ 0.281) or in
the median mean times to touch the cane (carrion crows:
median cane touch time ¼ 8.92 s, range¼ 6.74–61.20; NCCs:
median¼ 8.79 s, range¼ 4.42 –25.78; Mann–Whitney U-test:
NCC¼ 7, NNCC ¼ 8, U ¼ 19, p ¼ 0.336) during the first 50 trials.
There was no significant difference between NCCs
(median latency ¼ 7475 s, range ¼ 328–7475) and carrion
crows (median latency ¼ 3152 s, range ¼ 4–7474) in the
r6latency with which they touched the ball (Mann–Whitney
U-test: NCC ¼ 7, NNCC ¼ 8, U ¼ 12, p ¼ 0.068). stb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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Our previous study [38] did not confirm the presence of
enhanced physical cognitive abilities in the WPF, when com-
pared with a closely related non-tool-using species. However,
in line with the prediction that tool-use evolved with
enhanced physical cognitive abilities, this study found that
NCCs outperformed carrion crows in the cane task, but not
in two general learning tasks. This difference in corvids but
not Darwin’s finches matches the expectation that sophisti-
cated cognitive tool-related adaptations should be found in
species with sophisticated tool-use, as NCCs substantially
exceed WPFs in tool diversity and the complexity of tool
manufacture (reviewed in [28]).
The difference in NCC and carrion crow performance
cannot be explained by different levels of neophobia or motiv-
ation, because we found no significant difference in either of our
two measures between the two species, but it might be attribu-
table to the unaccustomed cognitive load that the manipulation
of a tool imposed on the non-tool-using species [45].
However, there are several reasons to treat the results
with caution. One is that the comparison groups of corvids
did not share identical rearing conditions: most of the
NCCs were wild-caught, whereas all of the carrion crows
were hand-raised. Although this could have had a substantial
effect on the results, it is difficult to predict exactly in which
direction. Another reason is that none of the carrion crows
reached the learning criterion in the cane task and, thus,
the performance of this large-brained corvid was worse
than that of the STFs. This is surprising, especially given
the excellent performance of other non-tool-using corvids,
such as rooks in physical tasks [36,46].
Also, the comparison of large-brained corvids and distantly
related WPFs did not expose a significant difference in physical
task performance between these tool-using species either in the
initial cane task or in the cane transfer task performance. The
lack of a difference in the cane transfer tasks is very surprising
given the performance of NCCs in other tasks that indicate at
least some sensitivity to physical rules and transfer to similar
problems [35,47,48]. One way of understanding these results
is that NCCs may simply use simple perceptional cues in
some situations but not in others [23,49]. Also, perhaps the
cane task poses a problem that is irrelevant to these species’
natural tool-use, and thus imposes an unanticipated measure
of difficulty on both species. Finally, it may be that the perform-
ance of NCCs, who usually engage in sophisticated tool-use,
may somehow be impaired when forced to engage in artificial
tasks involving choices between two options [50] or involving
restricted object manipulation as necessitated by the cane
task. For future studies, we suggest inclusion of two groups
of tool-users: one which uses freely manipulable tools and
one which uses the pre-inserted tools. We further recommend,
where possible, the avoidance of binary choice tasks.
Our data on the physical cognitive adaptive specialization
hypothesis are subject to some of the criticisms shared by
many studies of comparative cognition. For one thing, cogni-
tive characteristics other than the one of interest could have
been taxed by the tasks, leading to a pattern that does not
fit our prediction. We also may have missed the crucial sub-
category of physical cognition that differs between thespecies, having only presented one test of physical cognition.
Finally, the lack of identical rearing conditions between
groups is a common problem with long-lived and unusual
species that require significant funds to raise and maintain.
These problems are linked to some of the more universal
challenges confronting researchers in comparative cognition.
In the following, we address some potential solutions for
these challenges and touch upon our suggestions for future
research on tool-related cognition.3. Outlook
(a) Troubleshooting the physical cognitive adaptive
specialization hypothesis: getting ahead of
ourselves?
The ecological approach in understanding adaptive behaviour
and underlying cognitive mechanisms is an iterative process of
investigation, synthesizing hypotheses and predictions both
from the functional and mechanistic perspective. A classic
example of this process has been described in detail by
Smulders et al. [51] for food caching. Differences in brain mor-
phology between caching and non-caching species and
seasonally varying brain morphology in several food-caching
species from parids to corvids have been central findings fuel-
ling the cognitive adaptive specialization hypothesis for food
storers (reviewed in [52]). In the food-caching paradigms, eco-
logical knowledge not only helped to point to memory as a
likely solution to the problem which food hoarders face in
the wild, but later it helped to refine the hypothesis to fit var-
ious ecological circumstances of food hoarding animals. More
specifically, the realization that only a subgroup of food hoar-
ders need to remember cache locations for a long period lead
to the proposal that only these species should have a duration
of spatial memory longer than that of other species. Thus, the
spatial memory hypothesis for food hoarding comes from
knowledge of the function of food hoarding in animals and
is informed by the details of ecology.
In the case of tool-use, there has been a disproportionate
focus on human-like complex cognitive mechanisms like
causal understanding that may be involved in animal tool-
use. However, gradual improvements through associative
processes (i.e. associative learning of spatial relationships,
attention towards relevant cues) could improve efficiency of
flexible and context-specific tool-use just as well as complex
mechanisms and thus should be included in predictions.
Also, recent data suggest that the underlying cognitive mech-
anisms of even supposedly sophisticated tool-users such as
chimpanzees and NCCs are a mixture of complex and
simple mechanisms and those in between [23]. We suggest
that future studies put less weight on distinguishing between
complex and simple cognition in tool-use and that they are
careful to root predictions about tool-related cognitive mech-
anisms in detailed examination of the tool problems faced by
animals in their natural context.(b) Roadmap for future comparative studies of tool-use
and cognition
As we see it, there are currently two main approaches to take
in advancing our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms
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7underlying tool-related cognition. One is to refine hypotheses,
whereas the other is to refine methodology.
(i) Using knowledge of tool-use in a natural context to refine
hypotheses
NCCs exemplify how knowledge of ecology and natural his-
tory has been useful in suggesting areas of cognition for
experimental investigation. For example, geographical vari-
ation in NCC tools has been touted as suggestive of
cumulative cultural evolution [53]. Along with other field
studies that have demonstrated the existence of ample oppor-
tunities for social transmission of information in this species,
this suggests that it may be promising to look at social learning
in NCCs [53]. Furthermore, the observation that NCCs use
barbed pandanus tools in the appropriate orientation in the
wild (in order to be functional the tool must be held such
that the hooks on the barbed edge face backwards from the
tool tip) lead researchers to question the cognition involved
in this behaviour [54]. One explanation put forth was that
NCCs might have a human-like underlying understanding
of the physical properties of hooks, leading to an understand-
ing of the functional features of the tool. Another is that the
behaviour might also be the result of simple associative
mechanisms—possibly trial and error learning. Subsequent
experimental investigation with wild-living crows or those
held briefly in captivity showed limited attendance of the
crows to the functional orientation of the barbs and also
that when tools are dropped and/or picked up in the non-
functional orientation, repositioning arises from simple
associative strategies. In conclusion, the authors state their
view that correct functional tool orientation in the wild may
simply be the outcome of applying the correct procedural rules
of pandanus tool manufacture ([54], but see also [55]). This is a
laudable example of an observation from the wild that was rig-
orously tested using semi-wild experiments that were devised
to differentiate between the so-called high-level and low-level
underlying cognitive abilities. Its results clearly illustrate that
what seems complex is not necessarily so. Other observational
field studies on bearded capuchin monkeys (Sapajus libidinosus)
and chimpanzees inspired the hypothesis that enduring artefacts
play an important role for some nonhuman species in learning to
use tools by supporting persistent practice [56]. To summarize,
detailed knowledge of the behaviour from wild populations
will help to identify the type of the problems that animals are
faced with in nature and thus generate more accurate hypotheses
concerning the underlying mechanisms of their behaviour.
Thereby, it is essential to adhere to the principle of parsimony
and presume the lowest denominator of cognitive mechanisms
required for solving the problem. Improved knowledge of ecol-
ogy and tool-use in a natural context will help to formulate more
precise and appropriate predictions concerning which specific
cognitive mechanisms might be linked to tool-use.
(ii) Improving methods
Not only do we need more background information on species’
natural behaviour to inform predictions, but we could also
benefit greatly from improvements in methodology. Much
would be gained if more studies adopted a rigorous compara-
tive approach with interspecific comparison between at least
one tool-using and one non-tool-using species, using the same
or at least a comparable methodology. Including more non-
tool-using species in the comparison will furthermore ensurerobustness of an observed pattern. Another huge challenge of
comparative cognition is that we often are unaware of the full
suite of cognitive mechanisms influencing performance in a
given task. Consequently, we are often not clear about the ques-
tions posed, an issue which is compounded in multi-species
comparisons. Ideally, task designs should account for the differ-
ent species ‘non-focal’ cognitive traits, that is, those traits which
are not at the focus of an experiment, but can nevertheless have a
strong, sometimes central influence on task performance, such
as attention, motivation and temperament but also species
differences in perception [57,58]. A good example of this
approach is the study of Chappell et al. [59] that presents a
detailed analysis of the relationship between perseverance and
impulsivity on innovation in tool-use problems with human
children. One solution is to develop task batteries that include
tests of such general psychological variables in addition to
those specifically probing only the cognitive trait(s) of focal
interest [58,60]. Here, it is important to ‘find the right items to
test’ by rooting predictions in species ecology and observation
and the tasks must be revised as necessary. There is one major
conundrum inherent in the task battery approach for multiple
species (and also more generally in comparative cognition): in
order to yield comparable data, tasks must be standardized,
yet some species-specific task modifications are a ‘necessary
evil’ to increase ecological validity and the likelihood that each
species is being asked the same question. The crux of the pro-
blem is that we often do not know in advance what the
cognitive, motor and perceptual disparities between species
are and how they will influence task performance. Danger lies
in succumbing to the temptation of ‘quick and dirty’ exper-
iments that simply apply pre-existing paradigms to new
species without sufficient thought devoted to tailoring the pro-
blem to the species at hand [61]. Intimate knowledge of a
species through careful observation both in the field and in the
laboratory is the best help in designing comparable studies
and ecologically valid paradigms. In combination with an
improved understanding of animal’s overall psychological pro-
files (i.e. motivation, temperament, motor and perceptual
abilities, etc.), a useful framework inspired by Artificial Intelli-
gence could help to decompose demands of cognitive tasks
into their component parts [62]. This would help clarify the
nature of the problem, taking into account the information avail-
able to the animals and possible problem solutions.
One further issue we faced in this study is the interpret-
ation of failure. Should we accept the null hypothesis that
carrion crows simply do not have enhanced physical cogni-
tion? Our comparative results suggest that this may not be
justified and that further testing is needed to understand
these results. Seed et al. [63] recently reviewed this topic in
detail and suggest that understanding failures can be achieved,
for example, by deconstructing a task and lowering task
demands while asking the same question and by testing the
species in several different analogous tasks [64]. Another
way to understand failures is to look at whether the difference
between individuals that pass and fail can be correlated with
variation in another psychological trait [63]. These approaches
might be fruitful in future attempts to understand our results.
To conclude, in the field of comparative cognition, con-
siderable progress has been made by adopting an integrative
approach in understanding animal cognition [65]. The process
of the ecological approach is nonlinear, oscillating bet-
ween predictions generated from functional and mechanistic
knowledge of a behaviour. Thus, an understanding of the
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sideration of both ultimate and proximate standpoints. The
best approach to choose at a given time is determined by
common sense. However, the ecological context of behaviour
must always be kept in mind, especially during laboratory
studies of mechanism.
Permission to conduct experiments with the woodpecker finches was
granted by the Gala´pagos National Park and the Charles Darwin
research station (Project PC-16-07, permit no. PR.PT.P004.R02). For
the experiments with the crow species at MPIO, permission was
granted by the government of Upper Bavaria in Germany (Az.
55.2-1-54-2531-87-08). The work with the carrion crows at KLF com-
plied with guidelines provided by the Austrian Federal Act on the
Protection of Animals (Animal Protection Act -§ 24 Abs. 1 Z 1 and
2; § 25 Abs. 3 – TSchG, BGBl. I Nr. 118/2004 Art. 2). Furthermore,
as our experiments are purely appetitive, strictly non-invasive and
based exclusively on behavioural tests, they are classified asnon-animal experiments in accordance with the Austrian Animal
Experiments Act (§ 2. Federal Law Gazette No. 501/1989) and no
licence was required. Experiments were conducted by an experienced
animal caretaker, ensuring no animals were harmed by the exper-
imental procedure. All individuals participated and entered the
experimental compartments voluntarily. Focal individuals were res-
cued from the wild when taken out of the nest at a young age by
unfavourable weather conditions. Individuals were held in captivity
at the KLF (licence AT00009917) before and after completion of the
present study.
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